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ACTUAL CONTAMINATION IN THE FEDERAL 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES: TO PROVE OR NOT TO 
PROVE? 
Joan Tagliareni* 
[BJeneath every criminal sentence in this country-whether drafted by 
legislators or imposed by judges-lie so many unexamined and un-
tested assumptions that they lurk like the cores of icebergs, their dark-
ness exceeded only by their density.! 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Federal sentencing prior to 1987 was somewhat of a haphazard 
process. Federal judges had little or no guidance on what sentence to 
impose on a given defendant, which resulted in wide disparity of 
sentences for similar crimes and similar defendants.2 To reform the 
system of federal sentencing in this country, Congress created the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines ("the Guidelines").3 The Guidelines are 
the result of a major effort to cure some of the ills that plagued the 
previous methods of sentencing and to provide some cohesion in sen-
tencing law.4 The transition to a Guideline system, however, has not 
been entirely smooth; many of the nuances and subtleties of the 
Guidelines still require interpretation by the courts. This need for 
interpretation is inevitable with any large-scale reform movement 
that attempts to reach the length and breadth of an entire area of the 
law. 
* Clinical Placement Director, Articles Editor, 1994-1995, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRON-
MENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW. 
1 ARTHUR w. CAMPBELL, LAW OF SENTENCING ix (2d ed. 1991). 
2 See infra notes 10-22 and accompanying text. 
3 See infra notes 33-43 and accompanying text. 
4 See infra notes 33-43 and accompanying text. 
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Although the Guidelines strive to guide a judge throughout the 
entire sentencing process, the evolving case law in the federal courts 
reveals areas where the Guidelines are insufficient or unclear.5 One 
such area is that of environmental crimes, specifically the burden of 
proof that the government assumes when it seeks to increase the 
sentence of an environmental criminal.6 Prosecution of environmental 
crimes has been on the rise over the past ten years due to a height-
ened awareness of environmental dangers and their future conse-
quences.7 The public cares now more than ever before that environ-
mental criminals be treated seriously, in an effort to deter others from 
committing similar assaults on the environment.8 The complex nature 
of environmental harms, however, has led to a number of difficulties 
in sentencing individuals convicted of these crimes.9 
This Comment focuses on one particular characteristic of the Guide-
lines that address environmental offenses: the necessity of proving 
actual contamination when increasing a sentence. Section II of this 
Comment reviews the relevant sentencing history before the creation 
of the Guidelines, as a foundation for later sentencing law. Section III 
examines the Federal Sentencing Guidelines in general and discusses 
how courts apply the Guidelines when passing sentences. Section IV 
narrows the focus to the environmental Guidelines in particular, and 
illustrates the difficulties the application of these Guidelines engen-
ders. Section V discusses the recent case law that has addressed the 
issue of proof of actual contamination when increasing a sentence. 
Section VI considers the policy underpinnings for rejecting the proof 
of actual contamination requirement. Section VII urges that proof of 
6 See infra notes 74-132 and accompanying text. 
6 See infra notes 51-73 and accompanying text. 
7 Only 25 criminal cases were prosecuted throughout the whole decade of the 1970s. F. Henry 
Habicht II, The Federal Perspective on Environmental Criminal Enforcement: How to Remain 
on the Civil Side, 17 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,478, 10,479 (Dec. 1987). Since the 
mid-1980s, when Congress reclassed some environmental crimes from misdemeanors to felonies 
and began to increase the resources dedicated to the investigation and prosecution of environ-
mental crimes, the number of prosecutions has risen to over 100 per year. Mark A. Cohen, 
Environmental Crime and Punishment: Legal/Economic Theory and Empirical Evidence on 
Enforcement of Federal Environmental Statutes, 82 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1054, 1056 
(1992); Judson W. Starr & Thomas J. Kelley Jr., Environmental Crimes and the Sentencing 
Guidelines: The Time Has Come . .. and It Is Hard Time, 20 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 
10,096, 10,097 n.7 (Mar. 1990). "Given the level of public concern about environmental criminal 
activity and the potential damage that results to the public health from improper disposal of 
toxics, criminal environmental enforcement will unquestionably be a permanent and substantial 
element in the federal enforcement equation." Habicht, supra, at 10,485. 
8 See infra notes 1~0 and accompanying text. 
9 See infra notes 59-73 and accompanying text. 
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actual contamination should be required to comply with the spirit and 
goals of the Guidelines themselves. This section refutes the argu-
ments against requiring actual contamination, offers policy reasons 
for the proof of actual contamination requirement, and posits that 
requiring proof will bring sentence increases under the Guidelines in 
line with the procedures for increasing penalties in other criminal 
contexts. Section VIII posits possible methods of proof that would 
satisfy the actual contamination requirement. Finally, this Comment 
recommends that the burden of proof issue be resolved by Congress 
or the Supreme Court to end the debate and disparity among the 
circuit courts. 
II. HISTORY OF SENTENCING DISCRETION 
Prior to the passage of any comprehensive sentencing law, federal 
district court judges had little or no guidance on how to select the 
appropriate sentence for a given federal defendant.lO The prominent 
use of "not more than" standards illustrates this lack of guiding prin-
ciples.u These standards require only that a judge sentence below a 
certain level, subject solely to his or her own conscience.12 "Not more 
than" standards give absolutely no guidance on what prison term 
below that maximum would be justified for a given defendant.13 
Given this paucity of direction and advice, each judge had an ex-
traordinary amount of discretion in sentencing criminals convicted of 
10 Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. II, 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
3182,3224 (legislative history) [hereinafter 1984 Crime Control Act]. One possible reason that 
the sentencing powers of judges were so unconstrained is that judges have traditionally been 
viewed as somewhat calmer, more dispassionate, more scholarly, and maybe even more noble 
than the average person. See MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT 
ORDER 22-23 (1973). This characterization and position of honor afforded them more deference 
in their decisionmaking and, subsequently, portrayed them as less in need of guidance and 
direction. See id. at 16, 19, 22. Another possible reason for such broad sentencing power is, in 
the words of Marvin Frankel, that "we have chosen, or permitted ourselves, to stop thinking 
about the criminal process after the drama of apprehension, trial, and conviction ... has ended." 
[d. at ix. In other words, by the time the sentencing stage arrives, the whole criminal procedure 
seems somehow less important, anti-climactic. See id. at ix, 14. Since the sentencing process is 
somewhat of a second-class citizen as compared to the trial and the finding of guilt or innocence, 
there was a concomitant lack of concern for giving judges directions on what sentence to impose. 
See id. at ix, 12-14. A third possible reason for broad sentencing powers is that many judges 
are immune from organizational controls: their salaries are fixed by law, their terms are often 
long, and impeachment rarely occurs. 1 RESEARCH ON SENTENCING: THE SEARCH FOR REFORM 
54 (Alfred Blumstein et al. eds., 1983) [hereinafter RESEARCH ON SENTENCING]. As a result, 
judges value their independence and are not easily regulated. [d. at 54. 
11 FRANKEL, supra note 10, at 5-7. 
12 See id. at 6. 
13 See id. at 5-6. 
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federal crimes.14 This widespread discretion often led to extreme dis-
parity in sentences imposed on defendants whose criminal acts and 
criminal histories were similar.15 This lack of uniformity was largely 
due to disagreement among judges about the purposes of sentencing.16 
Initially, criminal sentencing was premised on the rehabilitation 
model, where the sentence reflected what was appropriate to restore 
the prisoner to a state of good repute.17 This view fell out of favor, 
however, when experts began to doubt whether rehabilitation could 
really occur in a prison setting, or whether anyone could ever really 
detect when a prisoner was rehabilitated.18 Consequently, each judge 
applied his or her own notions of the purposes of sentencing.19 Some 
judges retained the rehabilitation model, while others viewed sen-
tencing as the conduit for serving the defendant his "just deserts" for 
his criminal behavior.20 Sentences varied considerably depending on 
whether the judge viewed the goal as one of rehabilitating the crimi-
nal or of gaining retribution for the harm done to society.21 While the 
first goal seeks, in a sense, to "cure" the criminal and return him to 
society as a functioning, productive member, the second goal seeks 
simply to punish the criminal for his socially-unacceptable behavior.22 
Given this difference in ideologies, it is no wonder that sentences 
varied widely, even for similar criminal actions committed by simi-
larly-situated defendants. 
The policies and practices of the United States Parole Commission 
further confused the system of sentencing by altering how much of 
the original sentence the offender would actually serve in prison.23 
The Parole Commission released prisoners according to its view of 
the appropriate term of imprisonment.24 In determining that term 
14Jane Barrett, Sentencing Environmental Crimes Under the United States Sentencing 
Guidelines-A Sentencing Lottery, 22 ENVTL. L. 1421, 1422 (1992). 
15 See 1984 Crime Control Act, supra note 10, at 3224. Studies reviewed in the committee 
hearings on the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1983 give numerous examples of such 
disparity. In one sample extortion case, for example, the range of sentences varied from 20 years 
imprisonment and a $65,000 fine to three years imprisonment and no fine. [d. at 3227. Another 
study indicated substantial variation in the length of recommended prison terms-in one fraud 
case, the mean prison term was 8.5 years, the longest term was life in prison. [d. 
16 [d. at 3224 n.18. 
17 [d. at 3221, 3223. 
18 [d. at 3221. 
19 [d. 
20 See id. at 3224 n.18. 
21 See id. at 3224; RESEARCH ON SENTENCING, supra note 10, at 44. 
22 See 1984 Crime Control Act, supra note 10, at 3224. 
23 See id. at 3229; U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1 pt. A, at 2 (Nov. 
1993) [hereinafter GUIDELINES MANUAL]. 
24 1984 Crime Control Act, supra note 10, at 3229. 
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amount, the Parole Commission would attempt to compensate for 
what were perceived as disparities in the sentencing practices of 
individual judges and to increase certainty in prison release dates by 
setting a "presumptive release date."25 These actions by the Parole 
Commission gave rise to the same dangers of unfettered discretion 
that arose in the initial judicial sentencing procedure.26 
This division of sentencing authority between two essentially un-
guided bodies served only to enhance the confusion and disparity in 
sentences.27 Not only did discretion run unchecked, but the existence 
of the Parole Commission invited judicial fluctuation by permitting 
judges to keep the possibility of parole in mind when they imposed 
sentences.28 Further, a judge may have sentenced a defendant based 
on what he or she thought the Parole Commission would do, rather 
than on the true sentence he or she believed the defendant deserved.29 
This constant second-guessing of the judiciary and of the Parole 
Commission by each other served merely to compound sentencing 
ambiguity.30 This procedural process obscured the purpose of the 
punishment and heightened a defendant's uncertainty about the 
length of incarceration.3! The law of sentencing at this time was a 
complex and confusing system with too many unguided variables, 
resulting in a substantial degree of inconsistency.32 
III. THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES 
In 1984, pursuant to the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984,33 Congress 
established the United States Sentencing Commission ("the Commis-
sion") to address these problems and to promote honesty, uniformity, 
and proportionality in the criminal justice sentencing system.34 The 
goal of honesty requires that defendants serve the full sentence im-
25 [d. 
26 [d.; see FRANKEL, supra note 10, at 23-25. 
27 See 1984 Crime Control Act, supra note 10, at 3229. Arguably, this division of sentencing 
authority compromises the integrity and efficacy of punishment as well, given Congress's goals 
of sentencing. Congress recognizes four primary purposes of sentencing: (1) the need to reflect 
the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment; 
(2) the need to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conditions; (3) the need to protect the 
public from further crimes of the defendant; and (4) the need to provide the defendant with 
needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment. 18 
U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(1985). 
2B 1984 Crime Control Act, supra note 10, at 3229. 
29 [d. at 3229--30. 
30 [d. at 3221-22. 
31 See id. at 3221, 3232--33; RESEARCH ON SENTENCING, supra note 10, at 44. 
32 See 1984 Crime Control Act, supra note 10, at 3232. 
33 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-S580 (1985). 
34 GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 23, ch.l pt. A, at 2. 
418 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 22:413 
posed by the court, less an appropriate amount of time for good 
behavior.35 Uniformity seeks to narrow the "wide disparity in sen-
tences imposed for similar criminal offenses committed by similar 
offenders."36 The third objective, proportionality, mandates that a 
sentence fit the level of severity of the particular criminal conduct.37 
The Commission's primary goal was to draft guidelines detailing 
the appropriate types and length of sentences for over 2000 federal 
crimes.38 At the outset, the Commission analyzed 10,500 actual crimi-
nal cases to determine existing sentencing practices.39 The Commis-
sion then engaged in a series of policy determinations to integrate 
those practices into a coherent, comprehensive sentencing law.40 
These Guidelines, which apply to all federal criminal offenses, became 
effective on November 1, 1987.41 Due to constitutional challenges to 
their validity,42 however, the Guidelines did not become fully opera-
tional nationwide until January, 1989.43 
The Guidelines use a "point" system, where each characteristic of 
the applicable crime receives a numerical value.44 The "base offense 
level" reflects the simplest form of an offense in a group of generally 
related criminal activities, all related to specific federal criminal stat-
utes.45 The base level is increased or decreased by "specific offense 
characteristics" of the individual's conduct.46 The sum of the numerical 
values of the base offense level and the aggravating and mitigating 
specific offense characteristics of a defendant's crime is the "total 




38 u.s. SENTENCING COMM'N, SPECIAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: MANDATORY MINIMUM 
PENALTIES IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, at i (1991) [hereinafter SPECIAL 
REPORT]. 
39 Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary (Oct. 22, 1987), reprinted in FEDERAL 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES 811, 820-21 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series 
No. 146, 1987) (statement of Judge Stephen Breyer, Sentencing Commissioner) [hereinafter 
Hearings]. 
40 See id. 
41 GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 23, ch. 1 pt. A, at 1. 
42 SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 38, at i. In January, 1989, the United States Supreme Court 
upheld the constitutionality of the Guidelines against separation of powers challenges in Mis-
tretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 384 (1989). In Mistretta, the Court found that Congress 
did not grant legislative discretion in violation of the nondelegation doctrine because Congress 
itself legislated and delineated the policies and boundaries of the delegated authority. [d. at 373. 
43 SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 38, at i. 
44 Barrett, supra note 14, at 1424. 
45 [d. 
46 [d. 
47 [d. For example, kidnapping has a base offense level of 24, which would be increased by six 
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level, in conjunction with a number reflecting the defendant's criminal 
history,48 determines the appropriate sentencing range.49 The sentenc-
ing judge may impose a sentence anywhere within this range.5O 
IV. THE ENVIRONMENTAL GUIDELINES 
Part Q of the Guidelines applies to criminal offenses involving the 
environment.51 Although environmental offenses often raise civil law 
issues, many environmental statutes contain criminal penalty provi-
sions in addition to civil penalty remedies.52 The criminal penalty 
provisions have long been a part of environmental statutes, yet crimi-
nal prosecutions remained rare until the 1960s and 1970s, when prose-
cutors began to respond to the mounting environmental consciousness 
in the media and from the public. 53 In the last few years, prosecutors 
have become increasingly willing to pursue punishment for environ-
mental crimes.54 Thus, the criminal provisions of these statutes fre-
quently are utilized today.55 
Over ninety percent of environmental cases fall within § 2Q1.2 
(mishandling of hazardous or toxic substances) or § 2Q1.3 (mishan-
levels if a specific offense characteristic of a ransom was applicable, for a total offense level of 
30. See GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 23, § 2A4.1, at 47. 
48 The defendant's criminal history category is determined by analyzing the pattern of career 
criminal behavior. GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 23, § 4A1 intro. cmt., at 251. The number 
is determined by adding a certain number of points for the following: each prior sentence of 
imprisonment; offenses committed while under probation, parole, etc.; and offenses committed 
less that two years after release from a prior prison sentence or while in prison. [d. The total 
criminal history points from these factors determines the criminal history category (I-VI) used 
in the sentencing table. [d.; see also id., ch. 5 pt. A. 
49 Barrett, supra note 14, at 1424. A sentencing table is employed to determine where the 
values for offense level and criminal history category intersect, thus divulging the sentencing 
range in terms of months of imprisonment. GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 23, ch. 5 pt. A. 
In the case of our fictitious, ransom-demanding kidnapper, supra note 47, a defendant with a 
criminal history category of II and a total offense level of 30 would be subjected to a prison 
term of 108-135 months. See GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 23, ch. 5 pt. A. 
50 Barrett, supra note 14, at 1424. 
61 GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 23, § 2Q1. It is important to note here that the Sentenc-
ing Commission had much less actual experience to rely on when developing the environmental 
Guidelines than it did when developing Guidelines for other areas of the law, for example, 
offenses involving drugs. Gary S. Lincenberg, Sentencing Environmental Crimes, 29 AM. CRIM. 
L. REV. 1235, 1236 (1992). Due to the paucity of case law and legislative history, as well as the 
relatively new statutory base, the Commission faced a momentous task with very few resources 
upon which to base its determination of the proper sentences. See id. As a result, the environ-
mental Guidelines are rather embryonic and leave many questions to be resolved by the 
evolving case law. See infra notes 59-73 and accompanying text. 
62 ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: NATURE, LAW, AND 
SOCIETY 321 (1992). 
63 [d. at 322-23. 
64 [d. See generally id. at 327-35. 
66 See id. at 321. 
420 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 22:413 
dling of other environmental pollutants) of the Guidelines.56 The base 
offense level for a crime covered by § 2Q1.2 is eight, while for § 2Q1.3 
the base offense level is six.57 At the lowest level of prior criminal 
history, the base minimum sentence for a violation of one of these 
sections, with no adjustments for specific offense characteristics, is up 
to six months of imprisonment.58 
Both environmental Guidelines sections also list specific offense 
characteristics that further classify offenses according to the specific 
facts involved.59 These characteristics can raise the sentence to more 
than ten years for a serious violation.5O This tailoring stage is espe-
cially significant in terms of environmental crimes, because many 
different types of environmental crimes must fit into the two very 
broad categories of § 2Q1.2 and § 2Q1.3.61 
A troubling issue arises with the specific offense characteristic 
explained in subsection (b)(1) of both § 2Q1.2 and § 2Q1.3. Those 
subsections provide that the base offense level increases by four 
levels if the offense resulted in a "discharge, release, or emission of a 
pollutant into the environment" and by six levels if the discharge is 
continuous.62 The application notes accompanying this specific offense 
characteristic63 attempt to explain what constitutes a discharge, stat-
56 Lincenberg, supra note 51, at 1241; GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 23, §§ 2Ql.2, 2Ql.3. 
57 GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 23, §§ 2Ql.2, 2Ql.3. 
58 See id. § 2Ql.2, § 2Ql.3, ch. 5 pt. A. 
59 See id. §§ 2Ql.2, 2Ql.3. 
60 For example, take a case where a toxic substance was released into the ground (base offense 
level of eight). [d. § 2Ql.2(a). If the discharge was proven to be continuous, add six levels. [d. 
§ 2Ql.2(b)(1)(A). If the offense resulted in a substantial likelihood of death, add nine levels. [d. 
§ 2Ql.2(b )(2). If the discharge required a cleanup of substantial expenditure, add four levels. [d. 
§ 2Ql.2(b)(3). If the offense involved storage of pollutants without a permit, add four levels. [d. 
§ 2Ql.2(b)(4). This gives a total offense level of 3l. At a Criminal History Category of I (the 
lowest), a crime with a total offense level of 31 mandates a sentence range of 108--35 months. 
See id. ch. 5 pt. A. 
61 Lincenberg, supra note 51, at 1239; Benjamin S. Sharp & Leonard H. Shen, The (Mis)Ap-
plication of Sentencing Guidelines to Environmental Crimes, 5 Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) 189, 189 
(July 11, 1990). 
62 GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 23, §§ 2Ql.2(b)(1), 2Ql.3(b)(1) (hereinafter referred to as 
subsection (b)(l». The full text of the subsection reads: 
(A) If the offense resulted in an ongoing, continuous, or repetitive discharge, release, 
or eInission of a [''pollutant'' or "hazardous or toxic substance or pesticide"] into the 
environment, increase by 6 levels; or 
(B) if the offense otherwise involved a discharge, release, or eInission of a ["pollutant" 
or "hazardous or toxic substance or pesticide"], increase by 4 levels. 
[d. §§ 2Ql.2(b)(1), 2Ql.3(b)(1). 
63 "The application notes are part of the Sentencing Commission's commentary on the Guide-
lines. As such, they may shed light on how the Guidelines should be applied to particular fact 
situations, [although they cannot] alter the very meaning of the Guidelines." United States v. 
McGlockin, 8 F.3d 1037, 1060 (6th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1614 (1994). 
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ing that "[s]ubsection (b)(l) assumes a discharge or emission into the 
environment resulting in actual environmental contamination."64 
The statutory language-"assumes a discharge ... resulting in ac-
tual environmental contamination"-is subject to dual interpreta-
tions, thereby lending itself to uneven interpretation by courtS.65 Spe-
cifically, the language does not clarify the burden of proof the 
government bears with respect to actual environmental contamina-
tion when the government seeks to have a sentence increased under 
subsection (b)(1).66 One interpretation presumes that actual contami-
nation has resulted any time a discharge occurs.67 Under this position, 
the government, in seeking to increase a sentence under subsection 
(b)(1), need only prove that a discharge occurred to invoke the actual 
contamination provision.68 The second interpretation merely clarifies 
when subsection (b)(1) is applicable.69 In other words, if actual envi-
ronmental contamination occurred, this subsection could then be in-
voked to increase a penalty.70 If no actual contamination occurred, this 
subsection would not be available.71 This interpretation speaks only 
to the applicability of subsection (b)(l) and does not reduce the gov-
ernment's burden of proving that actual contamination did occur.72 
64 GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 23, § 2Q1.2 applic. n.5, § 2Q1.3 applic. n.4 [hereinafter 
Application Note 5]. The full text of Application Note 5 reads: 
Subsection (b)(I) assumes a discharge or emission into the environment resulting in 
actual environmental contamination. A wide range of conduct, involving the han-
dling of different quantities of materials with widely differing propensities, potentially 
is covered. Depending upon the harm resulting from the emission, release or discharge, 
the quantity and nature of the substance or pollutant, the duration of the offense and 
the risk associated with the violation, a departure of up to two levels in either direction 
from the offense levels prescribed in these specific offense characteristics may be 
appropriate. 
[d. (emphasis added). 
65 Compare United States v. Goldfaden, 959 F.2d 1324, 1331 (5th Cir. 1992) (need not prove 
environmental contamination to enhance a criminal sentence under subsection (b)(1», a/I'd, 987 
F.2d 225 (5th Cir. 1993) with United States v. Ferrin, 994 F.2d 658, 663 (9th Cir. 1993) (must 
prove actual environmental contamination to enhance a sentence under subsection (b)(I». 
66 Compare Gold/aden, 959 F.2d at 1331 (court read Application Note 5 to explain that 
"subsection (b )(1) takes environmental contamination as a given," with no proof required) with 
Ferrin, 994 F.2d at 663 (court read the language of Application Note 5 to conclude that "an 
enhancement under subsection (b)(1) requires a showing that some amount of ... substance in 
fact contaminated the environment"). 
67 See Brief for Appellant at 25, United States v. Strandquist, 993 F.2d 395 (4th Cir. 1993) (No. 
92-5174). 
68 See, e.g., Gold/aden, 959 F.2d at 1331. 
69 See Brief for Appellant at 25, Strandquist (No. 92-5174). 
70 See Ferrin, 994 F.2d at 663-64. 
71 See id. 
72 See Brief for Appellant at 25-26, Strandquist (No. 92-5174). 
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This interpretation merely says that once the government has proven 
actual contamination, a judge can increase the penalty as described in 
subsection (b)(1).73 
V. APPLICATION OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL GUIDELINES BY 
COURTS 
A. Cases Rejecting the Proof of Actual Contamination Required 
A few circuit courts have addressed this statutory interpretation 
issue in an effort to find answers to the questions of what burden will 
suffice to increase a sentence under subsection (b)(1).74 Although 
somewhat vague in their reasoning, most courts until recently have 
held that the government need not prove actual contamination or 
harm in order to increase the offense level under subsection (b)(1).75 
Each of these cases addressing the meaning of subsection (b )(1) dem-
onstrates a tendency to place only a very small burden of proof upon 
the government prosecution.76 
United States v. Bogas was the first case to consider the subsection 
(b)(1) provision.77 Bogas involved an airport worker who ordered the 
dumping of partially filled drums of oil-based paint, broken sewer 
pipe, construction debris, drums of dirty solvents containing xylene 
and toluene, and jet fuel additives into a pit on airport property in 
violation of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensa-
tion, and Liability Act.78 This rubbish was covered with dirt and later 
required exhumation by a certified waste operator.79 When the opera-
tor removed the top layer of dirt, a stench arose from the pit, requir-
73 Id. at 25. 
74 See infra notes 77-132 and accompanying text. 
75 See, e.g., United States v. Goldfaden, 959 F.2d 1324, 1331 (5th Cir. 1992) (proof of actual 
contamination not required by Application Note 5), a/I'd, 987 F.2d 225 (5th Cir. 1993); United 
States v. Sellers, 926 F.2d 410, 418 (5th Cir. 1991) (actual contamination inferred from chemical 
qualities). 
76 See, e.g., Gold/aden, 959 F.2d at 1331; Sellers, 926 F.2d at 418; United States v. Bogas, 920 
F.2d 363, 368 (6th Cir. 1990). 
77 920 F.2d at 367...{j9. Bogas was only the third environmental crime case to utilize the 
Sentencing Guidelines, once again demonstrating the incipiency of those Guidelines. See Starr 
& Kelley, supra note 7, at 10,100. 
78 920 F.2d at 365--U6. The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Li-
ability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1983 & Supp. I 1994), also known as the 
"Superfund" law, establishes a mechanism for obtaining funds to pay for cleanups at the most 
serious sites of contamination in the nation. PLATER, supra note 52, at 252. CERCLA imposes 
liability on a broad range of potentially responsible parties to increase the likelihood that a full 
cleanup will occur. Id. at 252-53. 
79 Bogas, 920 F.2d at 365. 
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ing the workers to don self-contained breathing equipment.8o On-site 
testing of the air disclosed the presence of volatile chemicals.81 Tests 
indicated that no contamination of drinking water had occurred, prob-
ably due to the filtration capabilities of carbon-bearing sand in prox-
imity to the site.82 Soil samples taken from the disposal pit itself 
contained only minimal contamination, and not in any dangerous con-
centrations.83 One expert qualified his opinion, saying it was impossi-
ble to tell the extent of background contamination caused by the years 
of planes landing and taking off in the area.84 
In Rogas, the United States District Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of Ohio refused to increase the defendant's sentence offense level 
because it was "unwilling to increase a . . . sentence by making an 
inference that [was] unsupported by any evidence."85 That court held 
that an upward adjustment in the sentence was unwarranted because 
the government failed. to prove actual environmental contamination 
by a preponderance of the evidence.86 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit over-
turned the district court sentence in Rogas and held that subsection 
(b)(l) does not "differentiate between a release that results in actual 
environmental contamination and a release that does not."87 The court 
reasoned that even though no actual harm to the environment may 
have occurred, it would be erroneous to find no actual contamination 
because "there was at least some visual contamination of the soil at 
the disposal site, there was readily detectable contamination of the 
[air] above the disposal site, and there must have been some water 
contamination."88 The court noted that this was true even if the pres-
ence of the carbon-bearing sand at the site would have prevented 
contamination of a nearby water supply.89 Accordingly, the court held 
that environmental contamination was present in and around the 
disposal pit, thus requiring an increase under subsection (b)(l).90 The 
court also suggested that a sentencing court could stray from the 
two-level departure prescribed in the third sentence of Application 
80 Id. 
8lId. 
82 Id. at 365--66. 
83 Id. at 366. 
84 Id. 
85 United States v. Bogas, 731 F. Supp. 242, 248 (N.D. Ohio), rev'd, 920 F.2d 363 (6th Cir. 1990). 
86 See id. at 244, 248. 
87 United States v. Bogas, 920 F.2d 363, 367 (6th Cir. 1990). 
88 Id. at 368. 
89Id. 
90 See id. 
424 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 22:413 
Note 5 if no actual environmental contamination occurred.91 According 
to the court, this departure was permissible because the Sentencing 
Commission did not consider a situation where no actual environ-
mental contamination occurred.92 This statement left open the issue 
of exactly when subsection (b)(l) is applicable and when such appli-
cation is inappropriate. 
Similarly, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
has addressed the issue surrounding subsection (b)(l) of the environ-
mental Guidelines.93 In the two cases to raise the issue in that circuit, 
United States v. Sellers and United States v. Gold/aden, the court held 
that the government need not prove actual contamination.94 In Sell-
ers, the defendant was convicted for dumping sixteen drums of haz-
ardous paint waste on the embankment of a creek that flows into a 
nearby river, in violation of the Resource Conservation and Recovery 
Act.95 Investigators discovered the waste one day after the dumping.96 
The Fifth Circuit held that actual contamination could be inferred 
from the high toxic level of the materials dumped.97 The defendant 
argued that since the waste was discovered so quickly, there was little 
likelihood that the waste actually contaminated the environment; yet 
the district court found, based on the evidence presented, that "one 
of the barrels was leaking."98 The Fifth Circuit explained that this 
evidence, as well as evidence that established the toxicity of the 
waste, was sufficient to satisfy subsection (b)(l), even if the waste was 
only in place for one day.99 
91 [d. The third sentence of Application Note 5 reads: 
Depending on the harm resulting from the emission, release, or dischal"ge, the quantity 
and nature of the substance or pollutant, the duration of the offense and the risk 
associated with the violation, a departure of up to two levels in either direction from 
the offense levels prescribed in the [] specific offense characteristics may be appropri-
ate. 
GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 23, § 2Q1.2 applic. n.5. 
92 Bogus, 920 F.2d at 368. 
93 United States v. Goldfaden, 959 F.2d 1324, 1331 (5th Cir. 1992), aff'd, 987 F.2d 225 (5th Cir. 
1993); United States v. Sellers, 926 F.2d 410, 418 (5th Cir. 1991). 
94 Goldjaden, 959 F.2d at 1331; Sellers, 926 F.2d at 418. 
95 Sellers, 926 F.2d at 412. The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 69014i992 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992, Supp. v 1993), is the federal regulation of all aspects of 
the solid waste cycle, from generation of waste to its treatment, storage, and disposal. PLATER, 
supra note 52, at 251-52. RCRA imposes monitoring and reporting requirements on all parties 
involved with the treatment, storage, and disposal of waste, with a particular focus on hazardous 
waste. See id. at 252. 
96 Sellers, 926 F.2d at 417. 
97 [d. at 418. 
98 [d. at 417-18. 
99 See id. at 418. 
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In Goldfaden, the Fifth Circuit was much bolder and more direct 
in interpreting subsection (b)(l) and Application Note 5.100 There, the 
court held that "subsection (b)(1) takes environmental contamination 
as a given" and that the government need not prove actual contami-
nation.101 The defendant discharged hazardous and industrial waste 
into a major city sewer system without a permit and pleaded guilty 
to a violation of the Clean Water Act.loo The court concluded that 
because the third sentence of Application Note 5 allows for upward 
or downward departures depending on the potency, size, or duration 
of the contamination, defendants would not be unduly harmed by the 
assumption that actual environmental contamination had occurred.l03 
Accordingly, the court held that the application of subsection (b)(l), 
absent proof of actual contamination, was not improper.104 This rea-
soning, requiring essentially no government proof of actual contami-
nation when increasing a defendant's offense level, appears to repre-
sent the broadest and most far-reaching interpretation of subsection 
(b)(1) and Application Note 5.105 
Unlike the Fifth and Sixth Circuits, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, in applying subsection (b)(l) and the 
accompanying Application Note 5, has been extremely reticent to 
resolve the burden of proof issue.106 In the two environmental criminal 
cases to raise the issue, United States v. Irby and United States v. 
Strandquist, the court avoided deciding the issue directly.107 In Irby, 
the defendant was convicted under the Clean Water Act for ordering 
the release of approximately 500,000 gallons of partially treated sew-
age sludge from a waste sludge holding basin into a nearby river at 
least twice a week for two years.1OB The court stated that "[e]ven if 
the government were required to prove damage to the environment," 
100 United States v. Goldfaden, 959 F.2d 1324, 1331 (5th Cir. 1992), a/I'd, 987 F.2d 225 (5th Cir. 
1993). 
101 Id. at 1331. 
102 Id. at 1327. The Clean Water Act (CWA) requires a permit for any discharge of a pollutant 
from a point source into the waters of the United States. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (1986). 
103 See Gold/aden, 959 F.2d at 1331. 
104 Id. 
105 See United States v. Strandquist, 993 F.2d 395, 400 (4th Cir. 1993); United States v. Irby, 
No. 90-5113, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 21687, at *2 (4th Cir. Sept. 13, 1991); United States v. 
Sellers, 926 F.2d 410, 418 (5th Cir. 1991); United States v. Bogas, 920 F.2d 363, 366 (6th Cir. 1990). 
These courts avoid the issue surrounding subsection (b)(l), deciding the case upon circumstan-
tial evidence, whereas the Gold/aden court directly states that there is no requirement for the 
government to prove actual contamination occurred. 959 F.2d at 1331. 
106 Strandquist, 993 F.2d at 418; Irby, No. 90-5113, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 21687, at *2. 
107 Strandquist, 993 F.2d at 400; Irby, No. 90-5113,1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 21687, at *2. 
108 Irby, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 21687, at *2-3. 
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evidence of the huge quantities of pollutants discharged proved that 
damage did occur.109 Because the court grounded its decision only on 
the circumstantial evidence presented, this case left the question of 
the government's burden of proof entirely unanswered. The court 
provides no guidance for cases where the quantity of pollutants is not 
so large, thereby making actual contamination less apparent. 
The Fourth Circuit again declined to resolve the issue in 
Strandquist.110 There, the defendant violated the Clean Water Act by 
pumping raw sewage from a marina into a storm grate that connected 
to a nearby boat basin.111 This activity, according to Federal Bureau 
of Investigation agents who observed the area, caused a strong, foul 
odor and created a brown, cloudy plume to flow from the outfall pipe 
into the basin.112 The court held that "the matter of proof of contami-
nation has not yet been decided by the Fourth Circuit and need not 
be decided here because the district court's finding of contamination 
[was] not clearly erroneous."113 The court explained that although the 
evidence did not reveal enormous amounts of, or lasting, contamina-
tion, sufficient circumstantial evidence existed from which the court 
could infer environmental contamination.114 Because the court based 
the verdict upon circumstantial evidence, this decision is only appli-
cable to the particular facts of the case and provides little guidance 
as to the proper interpretation of subsection (b)(1). 
Much like the Fourth Circuit, the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Eighth Circuit has faced the burden of proof issue, but has 
avoided making any clarifying decision.115 In United States v. Free-
man, the defendant was convicted under the Resource Conservation 
and Recovery Act116 for directing his employees to deposit drums of 
hazardous waste at an indoor storage space which lacked the neces-
sary permits to store such waste.ll7 The Eighth Circuit held that it 
was not required to decide whether the government must show actual 
contamination to justify an increase under subsection (b )(1).118 Rather, 
the court stated that "[a]ssuming this showing is required, the record 
109 [d. 
110 Strandquist, 993 F.2d at 400. 
111 [d. at 397. 
112 [d. Evidence presented in the case also included EPA scientific samplings and a dye test 
to verify the connection between the storm grate and the basin. [d. at 397-98. 
113 [d. at 400. 
114 [d. 
115 United States v. Freeman, 30 F.3d 1040, 1041 (8th Cir. 1994). 
116 See supra note 95 for a description of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act. 
117 30 F.3d at 1041. 
118 [d. 
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show[ed] environmental contamination" because the drums were 
leaking onto the floor, which had a drain that led to a storm sewer, 
and ultimately to a creek.119 As with the Fourth Circuit decisions, this 
opinion provides no assistance for future applications of subsection 
(b)(1). 
B. Cases Advocating the Proof of Actual Contamination 
Requirement 
In all of the above cases, the courts charged the government with 
little or no burden of proof when applying subsection (b)(l). Yet not 
all courts have obviated the proof of actual contamination require-
ment. In United States v. Ferrin, the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit held that an increase of a sentence under sub-
section (b)(l) does require a showing that some amount of hazardous 
substance contaminated the environment.l20 
In Ferrin, the defendant was the civilian supervisor of seven haz-
ardous waste handlers at a naval station.121 The defendant instructed 
his employees to treat a hazardous substance, isocyanate, by mixing 
the substance with another chemical.l22 When the mixture did not 
react as the defendant planned, he told the employee to pour the 
chemicals into a kitty litter-like absorbent and dump the contents into 
the municipal dumpster outside the facility.123 Due to an ongoing in-
vestigation of the defendant, naval investigators witnessed the dump-
ing and were able to clean up the area before the waste left the 
dumpster.l24 
The Ninth Circuit declined to increase the defendant's offense level 
based on subsection (b)(l).l25 The Ninth Circuit made that determina-
tion because, due to the fortuitous intervention of the investigators, 
there was no actual contamination of the environment.l26 The court 
stated that a defendant who pleads guilty to a statutory charge does 
not necessarily admit that a discharge occurred, because the statute 
does not require actual discharge as an element of the crime.127 Rather, 
the statute imposes liability for hazardous waste disposal even if the 
119 I d. at 1042. 
120 994 F.2d 658, 663 (9th Cir. 1993). 




125 Id. at 661. 
126 Id. at 664. 
127 Id. at 662. 
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hazardous substance did not actually enter the environment.l28 The 
court further reasoned that offenses covered by Guideline § 2Q1.2 
mayor may not result in de facto contamination, therefore the lan-
guage of Application Note 5 requires a showing that some amount of 
hazardous substance in fact contaminated the environment.129 Thus, 
according to the Ninth Circuit, actual contamination is a basic require-
ment for an offense level increase under subsection (b)(1).130 The court 
further commented that in most cases reasonable inferences from 
available evidence will suffice to support a conclusion that the illegal 
acts resulted in contamination.131 
This decision adds to the debate regarding the government's bur-
den of proof when it seeks to increase a sentence under subsection 
(b)(1). All the prior cases, in the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth 
Circuits, resolved the proof issue in the government's favor. 132 How-
ever, the Ferrin decision commands reconsideration of the issue and 
further exploration of the policies behind the actual contamination 
requirements. 
VI. POLICY REASONS TO REJECT THE PROOF OF ACTUAL 
CONTAMINATION REQUIREMENTl33 
Those individuals who espouse the view that the government need 
not prove actual contamination, but rather may assume or infer its 
existence, may invoke one or all of the following arguments: to require 
government proof (1) would cause undue expense, difficulty, and delay 
in the sentencing process; (2) is inconsistent with legislative intent 
regarding environmental crime; (3) ignores changed community 
norms concerning this type of behavior; and (4) is unnecessary, be-
cause any due process concerns that might arise are adequately ad-
dressed through the third sentence of Application Note 5, which 
provides for departures in the Guidelines. 
128 [d. 
129 [d. at 663. 
130 [d. 
131 [d. at 664. For further discussion on this point, see infra notes 235-39 and accompanying 
text. 
132 See supra notes 77-119 and accompanying text. 
133 Although no authority explicitly states these propositions, the information in the following 
section is based on an exploration of the cases and inferences derived from comments surround-
ing environmental law issues. 
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A. Undue Expense Argument 
The first argument claims that the requirement of proof merely 
serves to complicate the sentencing process, while providing little or 
no corresponding benefit. For example, non-technical personnel can-
not adequately determine actual contamination, due to problems of 
quick dispersal and the need to determine changes in the composition 
of air, water, and soil.l34 Thus, experts or trained personnel are often 
needed to make quantitative measurements with sophisticated ana-
lytical equipment, activities which are both costly and time-inten-
sive.l35 Presumably, therefore, requiring these additional factors at 
the sentencing stage would contradict the objective of a speedier, 
financially manageable sentencing process.l36 
Even if the government overcomes these temporal and pecuniary 
obstacles, further problems arise. l37 Proof of actual contamination 
requires statistical scientific and epidemiological data that is complex 
and foreign to most laypersons such as judges, lawyers, and juries.l3s 
Thus, the confusion generated by this information may outweigh any 
clarity that the information adds to the sentencing process. Moreover, 
the complex nature of the polluting substances involved in most en-
vironmental cases may lead to a "mini-trial and a battle between each 
side's experts over the risk associated with a particular . . . sub-
stance."l39 This, the argument concludes, leads to more delay and 
expense incurred at the sentencing stage. 
B. Legislative Intent Argument 
The second potential argument against requiring governmental 
proof of actual contamination propounds that such a requirement is 
contrary to a demonstrated legislative intention to address environ-
134 See Lincenberg, supra note 51, at 1256. 
130 See Howard Latin, Ideal Versus Real Regulatory Efficiency: Implementation of Uniform 
Standards and "Fine-Tuning" Regulatory Reforms, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1267, 1313 n.222 (1985). 
Latin argues that the use of the "sheen test" for determining oil pollution is preferable to other 
processes that involve costly and more complex quantitative analysis, because the sheen test 
depends on whether discharges are visible, and therefore, is simpler and cheaper to administer. 
Id. 
136 See GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 23, ch. 1 pt. A, at 5. 
137 See Starr & Kelley, supra note 7, at 10,102. 
138 Troyen A. Brennan, Causal Chains and Statistical Links: The Role of Scientific Uncer-
tainty in Hazardous-Substance Litigation, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 469, 501 (1988). 
139 Starr & Kelley, supra note 7, at 10,102. 
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mental crimes seriously.140 The fact that Congress has added criminal 
provisions to many environmental statutes evidences a desire to in-
crease the severity of punishment in environmental cases.141 In addi-
tion, Congress clearly has stated that deterrence of this type of con-
duct is a primary goal of sentencing.142 In order to accomplish this goal, 
the argument continues, environmental crimes, which have been criti-
cized as historically receiving quite lenient treatment,143 must be se-
riously and severely addressed. Thus, the argument concludes, it is 
oxymoronic that Congress would emphasize the need to treat envi-
ronmental crimes stringently and simultaneously create stringent 
requirements in the Guidelines that would hinder that effort. 
C. Public Concern Argument 
The third possible argument against requiring proof of actual con-
tamination derives from the public's concern about environmental 
crime and desire to see such crime seriously addressed. The statutory 
language listing the duties of the Sentencing Commission includes 
factors the Commission shall consider in determining a sentencing 
decision.144 The statute charges that the Commission shall take into 
account, where relevant, the "community view of the gravity of the 
offense"145 and the "public concern generated by the offense."146 More-
over, the legislative history behind the statute suggests that "if there 
were a substantial increase in the rate of commission of a very serious 
crime, the public concern generated by that increase might cause the 
Commission to conclude that the guideline sentences for the offense 
should be increased."147 
The fact that public concern about environmental crime has in-
creased lends credence to this argument. Public support for environ-
mental enforcement has grown markedly amid a sense that "clean 
140 Benjamin S. Sharp, Environmental Enforcement Excesses: Overcriminalization and Too 
Severe Punishment, 21 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. lnst.) 10,658, 10,659 (Nov. 1991). 
141 Sharp, supra note 140, at 10,659; Lincenberg, supra note 51, at 1237. 
142 1984 Crime Control Act, supra note 10, at 3259; see Cohen, supra note 7, at 1100. 
143 See Helen J. Brunner, Environmental Criminal Enforcement: A Retrospective View, 22 
ENVTL. L. 1315, 1338 (1992); Barrett, supra note 14, at 1421-22; Lincenberg, supra note 51, at 
1238. Congress has expressed concern that many white collar crimes, including environmental 
crimes, are often sentenced to small fines and little or no imprisonment, creating "the impression 
that certain offenses are punishable only by a small fine that can be written off as a cost of doing 
business." 1984 Criminal Control Act, supra note 10, at 3259. 
144 28 U.S.C. § 994(c) (1988). 
145 28 U.S.C. § 994(c)(4) (1988). 
146 28 U.S.C. § 994(c)(5) (1988). 
147 1984 Crime Control Act, supra note 10, at 3353-54. 
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water sources are drying up, natural resources are dwindling, the 
ozone layer is depleting, and population is increasing."148 Television 
has brought environmental catastrophes into our homes and into our 
collective consciousness.149 People worry about what environmental 
degradation will mean in their own lifetimes, and are even more 
fearful to contemplate its effect on their children's lives.15o Given that 
the public wants serious action taken/51 and yet sentencing for envi-
ronmental crime has historically been lenient,152 this argument con-
cludes that the need to prove actual contamination thwarts efforts to 
meet the public's demands for justice. 
D. Outcome Oriented Argument 
The final argument against requiring the government to prove 
actual contamination, which derives from the Fifth Circuit's decision 
in the Goldfaden case, suggests that assuming actual contamination 
is the most efficient way to handle environmental sentencing.153 This 
argument essentially claims that any mistakes made by assuming, 
rather than proving, actual contamination, are remedied by the third 
sentence of Application Note 5, which allows downward-or up-
ward-departures depending on the potency, size, or duration of the 
contamination.l54 Since any damage to the defendant caused by assum-
ing contamination can be compensated through this provision, the 
argument continues, it makes sense to assume actual contamination.155 
Such an assumption would increase efficiency, given the lax proof 
requirements, without creating a corresponding drop in correct re-
sults. Therefore, this argument concludes, the assumption of contami-
nation should be made. 
148 Lincenberg, supra note 51, at 1238. 
149Id. 
150 See Stanley S. Arkin, Crime Against the Environment, 204 N.Y. L.J., Aug. 9, 1990, at 3. 
151 PLATER, supra note 52, at 321. Plater states: 
Id. 
It would seem inevitable that criminal law would be enlisted in legal efforts to protect 
the environment, at least once the 1960s and 1970s had brought ... environmental 
consciousness to government and the public. "Throw the bums in jail" is at least as 
natural as "Sue the bastards" as a gut reaction to many pollution controversies. 
152 Brunner, supra note 143, at 1338. 
153 See United States v. Goldfaden, 959 F.2d 1324, 1331 (5th Cir. 1992), aJJ'd, 987 F.2d 225 (5th 
Cir. 1993). 
154 See id. 
155 See id. 
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VII. THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD BE REQUIRED TO PROVE 
ACTUAL CONTAMINATION 
The government should be required to prove actual contamination 
in order to increase a sentence under subsection (b)(l). First, the 
policy arguments against a requirement of proof can be sufficiently 
refuted to reduce any concerns that might arise if such a burden were 
imposed. Second, requiring proof of actual contamination directly fur-
thers the aims of Congress and of the Guidelines themselves by 
making sentencing less distorted and more fair.156 Third, this proof 
requirement would align environmental criminal sentencing with 
other criminal sentencing enhancement procedures. 
A. Why the Reasoning Rejecting the Proof of Actual 
Contamination Requirement is Flawed 
While each of the policy arguments rejecting the requirement of 
proof of actual contamination contains some validity, these arguments 
are too extreme and inflexible, and fail to take account of all the 
circumstances surrounding an environmental criminal prosecution. 
Each of those policies still receives adequate consideration when the 
government is required to demonstrate proof of actual contamination. 
1. Undue Expense Argument 
The argument that a requirement of proof is needlessly expensive, 
difficult, and time-consumingl57 is not necessarily a barrier to the 
actual contamination requirement because the argument is only valid 
at the extreme edges of proof requirements. This argument makes an 
implicit assumption that a very high standard of proof would be 
mandated.158 Thus, it is true that if the standard is extremely demand-
ing, the requirement may be much more burdensome than the corre-
sponding benefit it could produce. For example, it may indeed be too 
expensive and even impossible to prove the exact numerical concen-
trations of every pollutant in the soil at the time of a spill. Requiring 
such proof would, in effect, preclude the government from ever in-
creasing a penalty under subsection (b)(l). Similarly, a year-long 
scientific analysis to determine pre-spill and after-spill soil conditions 
156 GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 23, ch. 1 pt. A, at 2; see supra notes 34-37 and accom-
panying text. 
157 See supra notes 134-39 and accompanying text. 
158 See Cohen, supra note 7, at 1105. 
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would not be feasible or even desirable. In fact, the Ninth Circuit, 
which in Ferrin held that proof of actual contamination is required, 
conceded that "[p]roof of environmental contamination does not nec-
essarily require a full-blown scientific study."159 
Yet this argument fails because it is readily perceived that a world 
of difference exists between requiring some evidence of actual con-
tamination and not considering it at all. The argument loses force once 
a method is determined that can qualm defendants' concerns and still 
be manageable for the government to undertake.160 As the Ferrin 
court noted, the method need not be exhaustive to convey substantial 
fairness to the criminal proceeding.161 
2. Legislative Intent Argument 
The second argument against requiring proof-that such a require-
ment is inconsistent with legislative intent to treat environmental 
crimes very seriouslyl62-contravenes the intent of the Guidelines.l63 
This argument glosses over the unique nature of individual crimes, an 
issue that the Guidelines sought to address. l64 By stating, in effect, 
that one should look only to the designation of a crime as "environ-
mental," without any consideration of the individual circumstances, 
this argument completely misinterprets the goal of the Guidelines. 
The Guidelines seek to tailor the punishment to the criminal and the 
specific circumstances of the case, not to the general category of the 
crime.165 By focusing solely on the nature of the crime as environ-
mental, this argument subordinates the specific aspects of the crime 
to the general categorization, contradicting the intent of the Guide-
lines. 
Moreover, this argument completely ignores the equally important 
legislative intent to ensure fair sentencing. Certainly, Congress main-
tains valid concerns about environmental crime and desires to fully 
enforce the environmental statutes against those who violate them. 
159 United States v. Ferrin, 994 F.2d 658, 664 (9th Cir. 1993). 
160 See infra Section VIII, for suggestions of methods of proof that satisfy defendant's 
concern for fairness without overburdening the government. 
161 See 994 F.2d at 664. 
162 See supra notes 140-43 and accompanying text. 
163 See GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 23, ch. 1 pt. A, at 2; see also infra note 200 and 
accompanying text. 
164 See 1984 Crime Control Act, supra note 10, at 3333. 
165 GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 23, ch. 1 pt. A, at 2. As the U.S. Supreme Court noted 
in Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949), U[t]he belief no longer prevails that every 
offense in a like legal category calls for an identical punishment without regard to the past life 
and habits of a particular offender." 
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Yet to let that concern block out the equally important concern for 
fair sentencing is inappropriate. Because both issues are important to 
our society, neither should be diminished in pursuit of the other. 
Furthermore, both concerns can be addressed adequately, and they 
need not be exclusive of one another.1OO It is important to remember 
that the concern at this point in the criminal process is with sentenc-
ing. Our criminal justice system separates the sentencing stage from 
the guilt-innocence stage.167 This reflects an intuitive notion that a 
difference exists between deciding whether one can be punished and, 
once that question is decided, determining the proper punishment.l68 
At the sentencing stage of the proceedings, a conviction already has 
been secured, and the remaining issue is simply determining a sen-
tence that provides just punishment while being fair to the individ-
ual.169 Since the defendant already has been declared guilty, no fear 
lingers that the environmental criminal will exist unpunished or that 
other potential environmental criminals will remain undeterred. The 
fact that the defendant has been convicted and faces serious jail time, 
as ensured by the Commission's attention to environmental crimes 
when creating the Guidelines, alleviates those concerns. Therefore, 
requiring that the government show actual contamination to increase 
a sentence ensures fair and just sentencing, while causing no detri-
ment to the serious punishment and deterrence of environmental 
crimes. 
3. Public Concern Argument 
The argument that requiring proof of actual contamination sub-
verts the public's desire for "social revenge"170 on environmental 
criminalsl7l distorts the role of Congress and the government. In 
insisting that this demand be fulfilled, no matter the cost, the public 
is in effect asking Congress to subordinate individual due process 
concerns to environmental concerns. It is not difficult to see why a 
law-abiding citizen might place environmental concerns before fair 
sentencing concerns; one directly affects them, the other does not. 
166 See Sharp, supra note 140, at 10,665 (discussing opportunities that ''both advance environ-
mental goals and conform to the philosophical tenets underlying traditional notions of criminal 
sanction"). 
167 See Scott E. Sundby, The Virtues of a Procedural View of Innocence-A Response to 
Professor Schwartz, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 161, 169 (1989). 
168 Id. 
169 See United States v. Urrego-Linares, 879 F.2d 1234, 1239 (4th Cir. 1989). 
170 Arkin, supra note 150, at 3. 
171 See supra notes 144-52 and accompanying text. 
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Although these reactions are entirely understandable and may be 
widespread, the Constitution requires Congress to protect the rights 
of all people impartially, criminal and innocent alike.172 Our govern-
ment is responsible for ensuring that individuals are not punished 
unjustly or overpenalized for their crimes.173 Certainly, Congress must 
respond to public concerns, but Congress must also rationally balance 
the needs of society. The government cannot forego the needs of one 
to satisfy the wants of many simply because the many speak louder 
and represent a more "clean" and green sector of our society. 
4. Outcome Oriented Argument 
The final argument against requiring proof of actual contamina-
tion-relating to the "cleanup powers" of the third sentence of Appli-
cation Note 5174-is subject to a major flaw in that the powers ac-
corded to a sentencing court by Application Note 5 are insufficient to 
remedy the entire damage caused by an incorrect assumption. When 
a court finds that actual contamination occurred, the Guidelines direct 
the court to increase the base offense by four levels.175 The third 
sentence of Application Note 5 allows a departure of up to two levels, 
depending on the potency, size, or duration of the contamination.176 
Thus, a defendant whose actions have not resulted in any actual 
contamination, but was assumed by the court to have done so, still 
faces an unwarranted two-level increase in the offense level. Since 
this method cannot entirely erase the improper effects of an incorrect 
assumption, it is insufficient to justify the lowered burden of proof. 
B. Reasons to Advocate the Proof of Actual Contamination 
Requirement 
The government should be required to prove actual contamination 
not only because the reasons for dismissing this proof requirement 
are flawed, but because there are strong policy reasons supporting 
this requirement. The government should make a showing of actual 
contamination in order to increase an offense level under subsection 
(b)(l) because: (1) to assume, rather than be required to prove, actual 
contamination violates due process and fundamental notions of fair-
172 See U.S. CONST. Amend. VI. 
173 See 1984 Crime Control Act, supra note 10, at 3222. 
174 See supra notes 153-55 and accompanying text. 
175 GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 23, §§ 2Q1.2, 2Q1.3. 
176 [d. § 2Q1.2 applic. n.5, § 2Q1.3 applic. n.4. 
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ness; (2) the requirement of government proof is consistent with 
legislative intent; (3) the requirement of proof is consistent with rules 
of statutory construction; and (4) the requirement of proof furthers 
the goals to which the Guidelines aspire. 
1. To Dismiss Government Burden of Proof Violates Due Process 
and Fundamental Fairness 
The first concern hearkens to age-old notions of due processl77 and 
fairness, because the proof of actual contamination requirement is 
necessary to protect a defendant's rights. Some commentators hold 
that the advent and use of the Guidelines may necessitate greater 
procedural protections than were needed before the Guidelines went 
into effect.178 Prior to the existence of the Guidelines, a court was not 
required to be extremely specific in the determination of facts at 
sentencing, because no single fact had a quantifiable effect on the 
sentence.179 Therefore, the sentencing judge was free to disregard 
unproven facts or to give them very little weight in the ultimate 
sentence decision. ISO However, now that the Guidelines are in effect, 
each determination and finding of fact has a quantifiable effect on the 
applicable Guideline range.l8l Because the court's fact-finding has such 
a particularized impact on the sentence, the sentencing stage requires 
greater due process protections than were necessary previously.l82 
In pursuit of due process, the United States Constitution accords 
every defendant the right to a sentence based only upon accurate and 
reliable information.l83 Therefore, if a court bases the sentence on a 
foundation that is factually false, the defendant's due process rights 
are violated.l84 Consequently, it is a direct contravention of a defen-
dant's rights for a court to base a sentence on the assumption that 
177 Due process requires, in every case, "an evaluation based on a disinterested inquiry 
pursued in the spirit of science, on a balanced order of facts exactly and fairly stated ... and on 
a judgment not ad hoc and episodic but duly mindful of reconciling the needs both of continuity 
and of change in any progressive society." BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY 380 (3d. ed. 1969). 
Further, due process demands that "the law ... hears before it condenms[,] proceeds upon 
inquiry, and renders judgment only after trial." [d. 
178 THOMAS W. HUTCHINSON & DAVID YELLEN, FEDERAL SENTENCING: LAW AND PRACTICE 





183 HUTCHINSON & YELLEN, supra note 178, at 400 annot. 2, (citing Townsend v. Burke, 334 
U.S. 736, 740-42 (1948». Townsend v. Burke states, in relevant part, "it is the careless or 
designed pronouncement of sentence on a foundation so extensively and materially false ... that 
renders the proceedings lacking in due process." 334 U.S. at 741. 
184 See id. 
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actual contamination occurred, when that assumption could very pos-
sibly be incorrect.185 Moreover, defense counsel in criminal proceed-
ings are "under a duty to prevent the court from proceeding on ... 
false assumptions."186 Thus, a court must heed the defense counsel 
who requests proof of actual contamination before a sentence in-
crease, to prevent the court from proceeding upon a mistaken as-
sumption.187 
Further, fairness dictates that if the government seeks to increase 
the sentencing range and potentially increase the ultimate sentence, 
the government should bear the burden of proof, just as it does in 
obtaining the conviction.l88 There, the government's burden of proving 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt is imposed to protect the defendant 
from government overreaching.189 Similarly, in sentencing, these pro-
visions are necessary to ensure that the sentence is "fair both to the 
offender and to society,"I90 and that "the offender, the Federal person-
nel charged with implementing the sentence, and the general public 
are certain about the sentence and the reasons for it."191 
The proof of actual contamination requirement also serves as a 
necessary safeguard to protect against the imposition of unjust pun-
ishment.l92 In the last few years, environmental crimes have become 
the object of much attention.193 Although this attention certainly is 
well placed and long overdue, the danger arises that such intense and 
focused attention can lead to "overreaching and overapplication of the 
system, with consequent injustice."I94 If the desire for deterrence of 
this type of crime progresses too far, a reduced concern with the 
culpability of the offender results, causing innocents to be punished 
as sacrificial victims for the god called deterrence.195 
185 See id. at 740. 
186 [d. (emphasis added). 
187 See id. 
188 See United States v. Gordon, 895 F.2d 932, 936 (4th Cir. 1990) (a request to apply an 
aggravating or mitigating factor must be based on some evidence and "the moving party cannot 
meet his burden simply by offering conclusory statements"); United States v. Urrego-Linares, 
879 F.2d 1234, 1239 (4th Cir. 1989) (holding that each party is responsible for proving the facts 
necessary for any sentence adjustment it seeks). 
189 See WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW 45-46 
(1972). 
190 1984 Crime Control Act, supra note 10, at 3222. 
191 [d. (emphasis added). 
192 See Sundby, supra note 167, at 169. "[C]oncerns over wrongful deprivation of liberty may 
be as great, if not greater, at the punishment phase." [d. 
193 PLATER, supra note 52, at 321, 323. 
194 Arkin, supra note 150, at 3. 
195 See id.; Sharp, supra note 140, at 10,662. 
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Furthermore, because the Guidelines ensure that environmental 
crimes do not go unnoticed and unpunished, no need exists to augment 
the Guidelines by reducing the government's burden of proof. When 
the Commission created the Guidelines, it recognized that environ-
mental crimes previously received very lenient treatment, and com-
pensated for that deficit in the new Guidelines.196 Since the Commis-
sion "significantly increased both the probability of imprisonment and 
the length of the sentence" for environmental crimes,197 it would be 
patently unfair to increase a sentence again under subsection (b )(1) 
without the requisite proof. The Guidelines address the public's right-
ful concerns; therefore, these concerns now cannot be used to sway 
courts to increase stringent sentences that already reflect the seri-
ousness of the offense. 
2. To Require Proof of Actual Contamination is Consistent with 
Legislative Intent 
The second argument for requiring governmental proof is that such 
a showing is consistent with legislative intent. Even though Congress 
may concern itself with environmental crime, all criminal provisions 
must promote fair sentencing procedures.198 Nowhere is this concern 
with fair sentencing more apparent than in the creation of the Sen-
tencing Commission itself.199 The Guidelines attempt to assist judges 
in issuing sentences that are correct for a particular crime, and to 
reduce disparity among similarly situated defendants.2OO By assuming 
actual contamination, courts will fail on both accounts. As with any 
assumption, instances will arise where the assumption is made incor-
rectly. When that happens, the sentence no longer responds to that 
particular crime, but rather addresses a different, more serious, vio-
196 Cohen, supra note 7, at 1100. 
197 [d. 
198 GUIDELINES MANuAL, supra note 23, ch. 1 pt. A, at 2. 
199 The statute creating the Commission states, in relevant part: 
The purposes of the United States Sentencing ComInission are to 
(1) establish sentencing policies and practices for the Federal criminal justice system 
that ... 
(B) provide certainty and fairness in meeting the purposes of sentencing, avoiding 
unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants with similar records who have 
been found guilty of similar criminal conduct while maintaining sufficient flexibility to 
permit individualized sentences when warranted by mitigating or aggravating factors 
not taken into account in the establishment of general sentencing practices. 
28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B) (1988); see supra notes 33-37 and accompanying text. 
200 GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 23, ch. 1 pt. A, at 2; 1984 Crime Control Act, supra note 
10, at 3346. 
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lation. Similarly, a universal assumption treats differently situated 
defendants in a uniform manner, perpetuating the exact problem the 
Guidelines seek to avoid.201 The Guidelines seek to reduce disparity 
among similarly situated defendants, not among differently situated 
defendants.202 Since Congress created the Sentencing Commission 
with the explicit purpose of reforming sentencing procedures to en-
sure fairness to both the defendant and the public, this concern re-
quires that safeguards be adopted to arrive at the most correct and 
appropriate punishment.203 Accordingly, a just and correct punish-
ment under the Guidelines can only be reached if the government 
proves, rather than assumes, actual contamination. 
3. To Require Proof of Actual Contamination is Consistent with 
the Rules of Statutory Construction 
The third argument for mandating proof of actual contamination is 
that such a requirement is consistent with the rule of lenity, a long-
standing rule of statutory construction that says ambiguities should 
be resolved in favor of the defendant.204 The rationale behind this rule 
is that courts should be reluctant to increase punishment without a 
clear and definitive legislative directive.205 Although the rule of lenity 
primarily relates to statutory construction, the underlying rationale, 
and thus the rule as well, can be applied to Guidelines interpretation. 
The rule of lenity presumes that some ambiguity exists, and the 
Sentencing Commission has conceded that ambiguities will exist in 
the Guidelines. The legislative history behind the act creating the 
Sentencing Commission states that the Commission "can and should 
continually revise its [goals] and policies to assure that they are the 
most sophisticated statements available and will most appropriately 
carry out the purposes of sentencing."206 By advocating and encour-
aging revisions to the Guidelines, the Commission recognizes that the 
process of guideline-writing is an evolutionary one.207 The Commission 
201 GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 23, ch. 1 pt. A, at 3. For example, when such an 
assumption is made, Defendant #1, who caused no actual contamination, is treated exactly the 
same as Defendant #2, who did cause actual contamination. Only when actual contamination is 
proven, not assumed, can these plainly incorrect results be avoided. 
202 [d. at 2. 
203 See 1984 Crime Control Act, supra note 10, at 3222. 
204 See Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 812 (1971); ROGER w. HAINES, JR. ET AL, 
FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINE HANDBOOK 22 (1992 ed.). 
205 See Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 83-84 (1954). 
206 1984 Crime Control Act, supra note 10, at 3260. 
207 GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 23, ch. 1 pt. A, at 2. 
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acknowledges that the Guidelines may need revision because, when 
the Guidelines were first drafted, the Commission had to make some 
concessions.208 In attempting to "reconcile the need for a fair adjudi-
catory procedure with the need for a speedy sentencing process," the 
Commission could not feasibly detail every factor that could affect the 
application of the Guidelines.209 A sentencing system that covered 
every conceivable factor would be unworkable, while one that was 
very broad would fail to reduce disparity.210 Thus, the Commission 
created a manageable system, simultaneously recognizing that future 
improvements may be necessary. 
Moreover, the environmental Guidelines are particularly suscepti-
ble to ambiguity, due to the paucity of information available to the 
Commission regarding those crimes in 1984-1987.211 Since the Com-
mission had little material on which to base the environmental Guide-
lines, those Guidelines remain unsuited to their goals.212 Once the case 
law illustrates what issues arise and are important, the Guidelines can 
respond and take those issues into account. Therefore, the environ-
mental Guidelines will certainly need revision to resolve the ambigui-
ties that arise. 
Given that ambiguity does exist in the environmental Guidelines, 
courts should adhere to the rule of lenity by resolving such ambiguity 
in favor of the defendant. Thus, courts should err on the side requiring 
proof of actual contamination until this point receives further clarifica-
tion by Congress or the Supreme Court. 
4. To Require Proof of Actual Contamination Furthers the Goals of 
Sentencing Guidelines 
The final argument supporting the proof requirement is that this 
requirement furthers the Commission's goals for fair sentencing. The 
legislative history relates that the Guidelines strive to be the "most 
sophisticated statements ... [to] most appropriately carry out the 
purposes of sentencing."213 Interpreting the Guidelines so as to re-
quire guesswork and implication regarding the presence or absence 
of actual contamination does not appear at all sophisticated, especially 
given the fact that technically advanced methods currently are avail-
208 See id. at 5. 
2091d. at 2, 5. 
210 See id. at 2-3. 
211 See supra note 51. 
212 See Sharp, supra note 140, at 10,665. 
213 1984 Crime Control Act, supra note 10, at 3260. 
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able to make that determination.214 If the Guidelines and the accom-
panying Application Note 5 can be read to mandate assumptions and 
inferences, the Guidelines clearly are not providing the adequate 
guidance intended by their creation.215 If the Guideline sentencing 
process is to become more sophisticated, courts should rely on deci-
sions made by people with the most expertise in assessing risks to 
safety, health, and the environment, rather than on less technically-
adept inferences and assumptions.216 
C. The Requirement of Proof of Actual Contamination Aligns 
Environmental Criminal Sentencing with Other Sentence 
Enhancement Contexts 
In almost every criminal law context, sentence or penalty enhance-
ments are based upon and accompanied by proof of the underlying 
aggravating factor.217 Sentences are increased in various criminal con-
texts, usually to provide an even greater deterrent value.218 '!\vo 
common reasons for sentence enhancements are recidivist criminal 
behavior and bias-motivated crimes.219 Yet in neither of these in-
stances do courts make assumptions about crucial facts and then rely 
on those facts to increase the punishment.22o Therefore, requiring 
proof of actual contamination aligns environmental sentencing with 
other, longstanding, penalty-enhancement provisions. 
Even in instances where proof of the underlying aggravating factor 
is relatively simple to prove, such as recidivist criminal behavior or 
behavior while in prison, proof is necessary before that factor can be 
214 See, e.g., United States v. Strandquist, 993 F.2d 395, 397-98 (4th Cir. 1993) (EPA scientist 
tested water for fecal coliform levels per 100 milliliters and performed a dye test to verify 
connection of two water sources); United States v. Bogas, 731 F. Supp. 242, 248 (N.D. Ohio) 
(samples taken of soil, water, and air to compare contamination levels to pre-existing back-
ground contamination levels), rev'd, 920 F.2d 363 (6th Cir. 1990). 
215 See 1984 Crime Control Act, supra note 10, at 3346-47. 
216 See Sharp, supra note 140, at 10,660. 
217 See infra notes 221-24 and 226-31 and accompanying text. 
218 See generally Eric J. Grannis, Note, Fighting Words and Fighting Freestyle: The Consti-
tutionality of Penalty Enhancement for Bias Crimes, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 178, 220 (1993) 
(discussing penalty-enhancement statutes in the hate crime context). 
219 See, e.g., Nichols v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1921, 1927 (1994) ("Enhancement statutes, 
whether in the nature of criminal history provisions such as those contained in the Sentencing 
Guidelines, or recidivist statutes which are common place in state criminal laws, do not change 
the penalty imposed for the earlier conviction."); Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856, 865 (1985) 
("[TJhe presence of two convictions on the record may ... result in an increased sentence under 
a recidivist statute for a future offense."); Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. 2194, 2199 (1993) 
(approving the use of penalty-enhancement provision in state statute for case of "hate" crime). 
220 See infra notes 221-24 and 226-31 and accompanying text. 
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used to increase a penalty or sentence.221 A record of the judgment of 
conviction or a certified copy of the record in a criminal case docu-
ments the prior criminal acts and the descriptions thereof.222 Courts 
require real evidence, such as these documents, as opposed to mere 
assertions by the prosecution that such evidence exists.223 The prose-
cution must actually present these documents or other competent 
evidence to have a sentence increased based on these past actions.224 
The policy underlying such proof requirements in the arena of 
sentence-enhancement is that courts recognize the high value of free-
dom, and therefore impose burdens on the prosecution when the 
prosecution seeks to restrict or infringe on that freedom.225 This policy 
should be extended to the environmental crime context through the 
actual contamination proof requirement. A court should not rely 
merely on the statements of the prosecution that actual contamination 
did occur. Rather, the court should require hard evidence, just like the 
judgment of conviction in the recidivist scenario, to protect the defen-
dant's right against unjust punishment. 
Crimes committed with a discriminatory motivation also are sub-
ject to penalty-enhancement, if the requisite proof is present.226 The 
penalty-enhancement for these crimes, known as "hate crimes," is 
justified by demonstrating that the defendant had certain beliefs and 
that the defendant selected the victim based on those beliefs.227 Ab-
stract evidence of the defendant's beliefs is not enough.228 The prose-
cution must show a sufficient nexus between the defendant's beliefs 
and the choice of victim in order to have the defendant's penalty 
increased due to bias.229 Clearly, there are numerous difficulties and 
ambiguities involved in demonstrating such a connection. One must 
deal with human motivational factors, which are both incalculable and 
often indistinguishable. Nonetheless, courts require this tangible 
proof, irrespective of how difficult it is to demonstrate.23o Without such 
proof, penalty-enhancement is unavailable.231 
221 39 AM. JUR. 2n Habitual Criminals §§ 25-26 (1968). 
222 Id. 
223 See id. 
224 Id. 
225 See LAF AVE & SCOTI', supra note 189, at 46. 
226 Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. 2194, 2202 (1993). 
2Z1 Id. at 2200. 
228 Id. 
229 See id. 
230 See id. 
231 See id. 
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Consider, for example, a case where a longstanding, vocal, white 
supremacist is guilty of battering an African-American. To most peo-
ple, such a crime is obviously bias-motivated. Yet the court will not 
assume that fact. Rather, the court requires that the prosecution 
provide a high level of proof before the court will take the drastic step 
of penalty-enhancement. If the prosecution lacks sufficient proof, the 
penalty remains unaltered, despite many people's belief that the crime 
indeed was motivated by bias.232 
Just as a court choosing a sentence in a hate crime case requires a 
certain level of proof before it will increase the sentence, that concern 
for proof is needed to protect defendants in the environmental crime 
context. A prosecutor cannot secure a penalty-enhancement for a 
white supremacist who committed assault on an African-American 
merely by relating bigoted messages the defendant has spoken.233 The 
prosecution must tie those messages to the choice of this victim for 
assault.234 Likewise, a prosecutor should not be able to secure a sen-
tence increase for an environmental polluter merely by showing that 
the defendant committed a discharge. The government must connect 
that discharge to actual contamination for an increase to ensue. Thus, 
our system of criminal sentencing will remain consistent with respect 
to penalty enhancement, regardless of the underlying crime. 
VIII. SUGGESTED METHODS OF PROOF OF ACTUAL 
CONTAMINATION 
Once it is determined that the government should be required to 
prove actual contamination to have a sentence increased under sub-
section (b)(1), the next issue is what type of proof will suffice. Any 
method employed must satisfy both the defendant's concern for fair-
ness and the government's need for efficiency and manageability. 
From the outset it should be noted that the Ferrin court, while 
correct in requiring proof of actual contamination,235 incorrectly esti-
mated what form that proof should take. That court, probably in an 
effort to qualm government fears regarding this newly-imposed proof 
requirement, overextended itself in saying that in most cases, the 
burden of proof would be satisfied through the use of conclusions 
derived from inferences from available evidence.236 This method of 
232 See id. 
233 See id. 
234 [d. 
235 See United States v. Ferrin, 994 F.2d 658, 663--664 (9th Cir. 1993). 
236 [d. at 664. 
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proof requires little more than not requiring any proof of actual con-
tamination at all. People employ inferences when proof is absent. To 
permit inferences to satisfy the burden of proof returns the standard 
to the point in early case law where courts were forced to guess what 
occurred, rather than require that the government demonstrate what 
actually occurred.237 This statement by the court represents a retreat 
from the holding that proof of actual contamination is a basic require-
ment for offense level increase under subsection (b)(1).238 The Ninth 
Circuit, however, resumed its original position in stating, by way of 
example, that a finding that the pollutants came into contact with land 
or water, or were released into the air, would satisfy the require-
ment.239 
A preferable method of proof is for the government to provide 
results of tests performed or samples taken, showing that actual 
contamination did occur. Preliminary conventional tests should be 
taken of areas not influenced by the spill to determine the amount of 
background contamination that is already present in the area.240 With-
out this information on pre-existing conditions, no one can determine 
if a spill added any contamination to the site.241 Because the soil in a 
given area may have naturally high concentrations of some chemicals, 
this knowledge of background conditions is necessary to give perspec-
tive to any subsequent findings.242 
Once this background information is secured, the government ex-
perts should perform tests to show that the discharge added pollut-
ants to the area. Such tests should take into account the properties of 
the material discharged, and the regulations of that state regarding 
discharge of that material.243 The decision on what constitutes con-
tamination should not be arbitrary and sUbjective. Rather, the deci-
sion should be rationally tied to the legal standards, applicable to that 
location, regarding what level of that material is acceptable.244 For 
237 See, e.g., United States v. Freeman, 30 F.3d 1040, 1041 (8th Cir. 1994) (inferring contami-
nation from chemical characteristics and location ofleaked waste); United States v. Sellers, 926 
F.2d 410, 418 (5th Cir. 1991) (inferring contamination from chemical characteristics); United 
States v. Irby, No. 90-5113, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 21687, at *3 (inferring contamination from 
the quantity discharged); see also supra notes 95-99,108--09 and 116-19 and accompanying text. 
238 See Ferrin, 994 F.2d at 663. 
239 [d. at 664. 
240 Brieffor Appellee at 18, United States v. Bogas, 731 F. Supp. 242 (N.D. Ohio) (No. 90-3228), 
rev'd, 920 F.2d 363 (6th Cir. 1990). 
241 See United States v. Bogas, 731 F. Supp. 242,248 (N.D. Ohio), rev'd, 920 F.2d 363 (6th Cir. 
1990). 
242 See Brief for Appellee at 18-19, Bogus (No. 90-3228). 
243 Brief for Appellant at 33, United States v. Strandquist, 993 F.2d 395 (4th Cir. 1993) (No. 
92-5174). 
244 See id. at 34-36. 
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example, the Clean Water Act authorizes states to set water quality 
standards.245 Those water quality standards reflect the state's deter-
mination of what constitutes contamination.246 Where specific criteria 
are set for determining whether contamination exists, those criteria 
should be followed in the sentencing decision.247 This will be relatively 
simple to do in the vast majority of cases, where large quantities of 
pollutants are dumped into the ground or water. 
The government may still find this too weighty a burden and may 
clamor for a reduced standard, however, especially in cases where the 
pollutant commingled with other substances or where the spill oc-
curred a number of years ago.248 If a court is sympathetic to the 
government's situation, perhaps a lower, although less desirable, 
standard would suffice in those instances only. For example, the 
method of proof could be the testimony of a reputable expert, uncon-
nected to any government actor, who would assume the professional 
position that it is very likely there was contamination at the site, even 
if only for a limited time. The professional witness must be willing to 
place his or her credibility behind such a decision. The validity of this 
method, of course, presumes that the expert witness is a disinterested 
party, with credible qualifications in this type of environmental sci-
ence.249 This method is less desirable than one requiring "hard" proof, 
because this method requires the environmental expert to make some 
inferences from data and tests. Yet such a showing, though modest, 
is still preferable to a non-technical judge making assumptions of 
contamination based on no evidence at all. 
These suggestions only begin to consider methods that would be 
sufficient to satisfy the government's burden of proof. Those with 
more experience in the technical aspects of environmental study could 
probably derive many other methods that would balance the needs of 
both parties in an environmental prosecution. 
IX. CONCLUSION 
The debate over the burden of proof regarding actual contamina-
tion must end to ensure fair sentencing for environmental defendants. 
245 33 u.s.c. § 1313(a)(1986). 
246 See Brief for Appellant at 34, Strandquist (No. 92-5174). 
247 [d. at 35. 
248 The government is limited in the cases it may bring by a five year statute of limitations. 
28 U.S.C. § 2462 (1988). Thus, the government could bring suit for a spill that occurred four 
years ago, but all the traces of the spill may be gone. 
249 Presumably, any expert witness will be disinterested and objective. Of course, procedural 
devices provided by the adversary system ensure that the testimony is correct. Thus, defense 
counsel can cross-examine the expert witness to glean objective, truthful information. 
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Congress should amend Application Note 5 accompanying subsection 
(b)(1) of the environmental Guidelines to make it clear that the gov-
ernment must make some showing of proof of actual contamination in 
order to increase a sentence under that subsection. Such an amend-
ment should go further to designate what type of proof would suffice 
in order to balance the defendant's need for fairness with the govern-
ment's need for manageability. By doing so, Congress would preclude 
any further confusion in the federal district courts as to the sufficiency 
of offered evidence. Alternatively, the United States Supreme Court 
could decide this proof issue to end the disparity among the circuit 
courts. It is preferable, however, for Congress to amend the Guide-
lines so that Congress can dictate precisely what proffered evidence 
will be sufficient to satisfy the government's burden. Only when this 
issue is resolved can the courts further the goals and spirit of the 
Guidelines themselves. 
